Abstract. This paper presents the first independent and systematic linear, differential and impossible-differential (ID) cryptanalyses of MIBS, a lightweight block cipher aimed at constrained devices such as RFID tags and sensor networks. Our contributions include linear attacks on up to 18-round MIBS, and the first ciphertext-only attacks on 13-round MIBS. Our differential analysis reaches 14 rounds, and our impossibledifferential attack reaches 12 rounds. These attacks do not threaten the full 32-round MIBS, but significantly reduce its margin of security by more than 50%. One fact that attracted our attention is the striking similarity of the round function of MIBS with that of the Camellia block cipher. We actually used this fact in our ID attacks. We hope further similarities will help build better attacks for Camellia as well.
Introduction
This paper describes the first independent and systematic linear, differential and impossible-differential cryptanalyses on reduced-round variants of the MIBS block cipher. MIBS is a lightweight cipher, with a Feistel structure, aimed at ubiquitous but constrained environments, such as RFID tags and sensor networks [6] . MIBS operates on 64-bit blocks, uses keys of 64 or 80 bits and iterates 32 rounds. There is a striking similarity between the round functions of MIBS and Camellia ciphers [1] . This feature was actually exploited in our impossibledifferential analysis of MIBS in Sect.5. Our results are summarized in Table 6 .
Previous cryptanalytic results on MIBS, presented by its designers, concerned differential and linear relations on up to 4-round MIBS. Nonetheless, no full attacks were ever detailed. We provide better distinguishers and attacks on up to 18 rounds, effectively reducing the margin of security of MIBS by more than 50% as originally predicted by its designers.
A Brief Description of MIBS
MIBS is a block cipher following a Feistel Network design [6] . MIBS operates on 64-bit blocks, uses keys of 64 or 80 bits, and iterates 32 rounds for both key sizes. All internal operations in MIBS are nibble-wise, that is, on 4-bit words. The round function F of MIBS has an SPN structure composed of an xor layer with a round subkey, an S layer of 4 × 4-bit S-boxes, and a linear transformation layer (with branch number 5), in this order.
For our attack purposes, the linear transformation (P layer) is most relevant. Let (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 , y 5 , y 6 , y 7 , y 8 ) denote the input to this layer. Its output, (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 , y 5 , y 6 , y 7 , y 8 ), can be described as y 1 = y 1 ⊕ y 2 ⊕ y 4 ⊕ y 5 ⊕ y 7 ⊕ y 8 ; y 2 = y 2 ⊕ y 3 ⊕ y 4 ⊕ y 5 ⊕ y 6 ⊕ y 7 ; y 3 = y 1 ⊕ y 2 ⊕ y 3 ⊕ y 5 ⊕ y 6 ⊕ y 8 ; y 4 = y 2 ⊕ y 3 ⊕ y 4 ⊕ y 7 ⊕ y 8 ; y 5 = y 1 ⊕ y 3 ⊕ y 4 ⊕ y 5 ⊕ y 8 ; y 6 = y 1 ⊕ y 2 ⊕ y 4 ⊕ y 5 ⊕ y 6 ; y 7 = y 1 ⊕ y 1 ⊕ y 3 ⊕ y 6 ⊕ y 7 ; y 8 = y 1 ⊕ y 3 ⊕ y 4 ⊕ y 6 ⊕ y 7 ⊕ y 8 ,
where ⊕ denotes exclusive or.
The input text block to the i-th round is denoted (L i−1 , R i−1 ), with L i , R i ∈ {0, 1} 32 , and (R i−1 ⊕ F (K i , L i−1 ), L i−1 ) denotes the round output. (L 0 , R 0 ) denotes a plaintext block.
The key schedule of MIBS is adapted from the key schedule of PRESENT [4] . There are two versions of key schedule of MIBS, both generating 32-bit round subkeys K i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 32, from 64-bit and 80-bit user keys, respectively. Let state i denote the ith round key state; state 0 denote the user key. The 80-bit version of key schedule of MIBS, with bit numbering in right-to-left order from 1 to 80, is as follows: for i = 1 to i = 32,
. where '≫' means bitwise right-rotation, ' ' means string concatenation, and '∼' indicates a sequence of bit positions. We refer to [6] for further details about MIBS components.
Linear Cryptanalysis
In [6] , the designers claimed security of MIBS against linear cryptanalysis by providing a 4-round linear relation with 7 active S-boxes, and overall bias 2 −8 .
They assumed that this relation was iterative (although it was not) and claimed resistance of the full 32-round MIBS to linear attacks. Firstly, we derived the linear approximation table (LAT) for 1 the 4 × 4 S-box of MIBS. See Table 7 in the appendix. We note that this S-box is linearly 4-uniform 2 (an analogous concept to that used in DC, Sect. 4). Thus, the highest bias is 2 −2 . We have found a better 4-round linear relation, described in Table 1 , with only six active S-boxes and bias 2 −7 . The last pair of bit masks in Table 1 stand for the output masks after the swapping of half blocks in a round.
We denote the input mask to the i-th round as (Γ L i−1 , Γ R i−1 ). The (i + 1)-th round input mask is the i-th round output mask. Values subscripted by 'x' are in hexadecimal base. 
Searching for Linear Relations for MIBS
For a systematic linear analysis of MIBS, we automated the search procedure by creating a program to look for linear relations of MIBS according to the following criteria:
-focus on iterative linear relations, preferably; -maximize the overall bias by minimizing the number of active S-boxes; -use the fact that the S-box is linearly 4-uniform (Table 7) ; -use the fact that the branch number of the P permutation in the F function of MIBS is 5 (which is claimed to be optimal)
Taking into account these criteria, the best result of our search is the 16-round linear relation with 30 active S-boxes and bias 2 −31 in Table 2 . From the LAT of MIBS, Table 7 , there are six possible instantiations of this linear relation, that is, (w, z) ∈ {(2 x , 6 x ), (6 x , 2 x ), (4 x , e x ), (e x , 4 x ), (8 x Table 2 accounts for the swapping between half blocks. The first 15 rounds of this distinguisher corresponds to the best 15-round linear relation (with 28 active S-boxes, and bias 2 −29 ) that will be used in a key-recovery attack in Sect. 3.2. 
17-round Multiple Linear Attack
We proposed a key-recovery attack on 17-round MIBS by considering the first fifteen rounds of the linear distinguisher in Table 2 , placed between rounds 2 and 16. We recover subkey bits from the first and last rounds.
The main relation for this 17-round attack is
where w is one of the values indicated in Sect. 3.1. Due to the low branch number of the P layer (see Sect. 2), only two subkey nibbles need to be guessed in both F (K 1 , L 0 ) and F (K 17 , R 0 ). See Fig. 1 . Following [3] , we use four variations of (2) for four values of w that lead to linearly independent relations:
According to [3] , the combined bias of these multiple linear relations is 4 · (2 −29 ) 2 = 2 −28 . The data complexity is 4/(2 −28 ) 2 = 2 58 KP. The attack procedure follows [7] : -Take 2 58 known plaintexts and request the corresponding ciphertexts encrypted under the unknown secret key K.
-for w ∈ {2 x , 4 x , 8 x , d x } keep independent counters for each possible value of subkey bits which correspond to active S-boxes: S 1 and S 6 in both rounds 1 and 17.
holds, where, for instance, w = 6: For each key candidate K i , let T w i be the number of plaintexts such that According to the key schedule of MIBS, there is no overlapping between the subkeys K 1,1 , K 1,6 , K 17,1 , K 17, 6 . Thus, the time complexity becomes 2
16
2 · 17 ·2 58 ≈ 2 69 17-round MIBS encryptions because partial decryption of two nibbles in the first round and two other nibbles in the 17th round costs about half a round. The memory complexity is the 2 58 blocks. The remaining 64 key bits can be recovered by exhaustive search without affecting the overall attack complexity. Following [9] , the success probability of this attack, p S , is computed assuming N · |p − 1/2| 2 = 4, and a = 8
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
Ciphertext-Only Attack
Assuming the input plaintext is coded as ASCII text, we can perform a ciphertextonly attack. In this setting though, the codebook size is reduced to 2 64−8 = 2 56 , since the most significant bit of every byte is zero. We use the first 13 rounds of (Table 2) , which imply the following linear relation: L 0 · 80008080 x ⊕ L 17 · e0000e00 x ⊕ R 17 · 80008080 x = 0, with bias 2 −27 . We perform a distinguishfrom-random attack, using 2 · (2 −27 ) −2 = 2 55 CO, and equivalent number of encryptions. The memory complexity is negligible. According to [7] , assuming Matsui's algorithm 1, the success probability of this distinguishing attack is about 97.7%.
18-round Linear Attack
We can use the full 16-round relation in Table 2 with bias 2 −31 for a key-recovery attack on 18-round MIBS. The attack procedure is similar to the one in Sect. 3.2, but this time we recover K 1,1 , K 1,6 , K 18,6 , K 18,7 , K 18,8 . We found no overlapping in these subkeys, so we recover 20 subkey bits in total. The linear relations for this attack is
For each pair (w, z) in Sect. 3.1 we have an independent linear relation. Following [3] , the combined bias of these multiple linear relations is 6 · (2 −31 ) 2 = 2 −29.7 . The data complexity is 3/(2 −29.7 ) 2 = 2 60.98 KP. The time complexity is 2 20 · 2 60.98 · 5/8 · 1/18 ≈ 2 76.13 18-round computations, since partial decryption of two nibble in the first round, and three nibbles in the 18th round costs less than one-round computation. Memory complexity is the same as data complexity. According to [9] , the success probability of this attack is 72.14%.
Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis (DC) was originally proposed by Biham and Shamir in [2] . In [6] , the designers claim security of MIBS against DC by providing a 4-round characteristic with six active S-boxes, and probability 2 −15 . They assumed that this characteristic was iterative (although it is not) and claimed resistance of the full 32-round MIBS to DC.
Searching for Differential Characteristics of MIBS
We have computed the difference distribution table (DDT) for 3 the 4 × 4 S-box of MIBS. See Table 8 in the appendix. We note that this S-box is differentially 4-uniform 4 . So, the highest probability for any difference propagation across this S-box is 2 −2 . For a systematic differential analysis of MIBS, we automated the search for differential characteristics by creating a program to look for differential characteristics for MIBS according to the following criteria:
(a) focus on iterative characteristics, preferably; (b) maximize the overall probability by minimizing the number of active S-boxes; (c) use the fact that the S-box is differentially 4-uniform (Table 8 ) [8] ; (d) use the fact that the branch number of the P permutation in the F function of MIBS is 5
Using these criteria, we have found two 12-round differential characteristics, both with probability 2 −56 . These characteristics have 28 active S-boxes in total, and for each S-box we chose the largest entries in the DDT. One characteristic is detailed in Table 3 . The other characteristic is obtained from Table 3 by turning it upside-down (due to the symmetry of the Feistel Network scheme).
13-round Differential Attack
We perform a key-recovery attack on 13-round MIBS by placing the 12-round characteristic in Table 3 in rounds 1 up to 12. We recover 24 subkey bits from the 13th round. The attack procedure is as follows:
(a) take c · 2 56 pairs of plaintext blocks P i and P j which satisfy P i ⊕ P j = (EEE0E0EE x , 50500550 x ) and obtain their corresponding ciphertexts
(b) keep counters for each possible value of six subkey nibbles of K 13 corresponding to the six E x nibble differences in the right half of the ciphertext, namely K 13,1 , K 13,2 , K 13,3 , K 13,5 , K 13,7 and K 13,8 ; (c) keep only those text pairs for which the right half of the ciphertext difference equals EEE0E0EE x ; 
, and compare with the output difference of the S-box layer inside F (K 13 , R i 13 ) ⊕ F (K 13 , R j 13 ); discard the pairs that do not match one of the seven possible output differences of the S-box, according to the DDT (Table 8) with input difference E x ; from the input difference to the 13th round, increment counters corresponding to each suggested 24 subkey bits by the input difference EEE0E0EE x , and
Following [2] , we estimate the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), as 2
14 , since p = 2 −56 , k = 24, α = 1 (we expect one subkey on average to be suggested in step (d)), β = 2 −32 · (7/15) 6 · (2 −4 ) 2 , since ∆R 13 = EEE0E0EE x gives a 32-bit condition, every output difference to an S-box whose input difference is E x can have only seven possible nonzero output differences, and the two S-boxes with input difference 0 can only have 0 output difference. We estimate about c = 32 right pairs to uniquely determine the correct subkey values. This means 2 61 CP.
Step (c) imposes a 32-bit condition on the pairs. So, about 2 61 /2 32 = 2 29 pairs survive. In step (d), the complexity corresponds to 2 · 2 29 one-round computations. This corresponds to about 2 30 /13 ≈ 2
26.3
13-round computations. The memory complexity corresponds to 2 24 counters. If the user key has 64 bits, the remaining 40 key bits requires 2 40 13-round computations; if the key is 80-bit long, then the remaining 56 key bits requires 2 56 13-round computations. According to [9] , the success probability p S of this attack, for SNR = 2 14 , a = 7 (i.e. assuming we expect the correct 24-bit subkey to be ranked among the 7 highest counters), N = 2 61 CP, p = 2 −56 , is
14-round Differential Attack
For 14-round MIBS, we studied a key-recovery attack by placing the 12-round characteristic in Table 3 between rounds 2 and 13. We recover subkey bits from K 1 and K 14 at the same time. The attack procedure is as follows:
(a) consider m structures of plaintexts, such that R 0 contains all possible 32-bit values, but in the L 0 , half of the text contain arbitrary 32-bit values, and half of them contain L 0 ⊕ 50500550 7 , and each of the six nibbles of K 14 corresponding to the six E x nibble differences in the right half of the ciphertext; this corresponds to 40 subkey bits; (d) for each pair of plaintext with indices i, j, compute
, and compare it with the output difference of the S-box layer inside
; discard the pairs that do not match one of the seven possible output differences of the S-box layer, according to the DDT (Table 8) with input difference 5 x ; also, the S-boxes with input difference 0 can only have 0 output difference; from the input difference to the 1st round, increment counters corresponding to each suggested 16 subkey bits by the input difference 50500550 x , and
, and compare it with the output difference of the S-box layer inside F (K 14 , R i 14 ) ⊕ F (K 14 , R j 14 ); discard the pairs that do not match one of the seven possible output differences of the S-box, according to the DDT (Table 8) with input difference E x ; also, the S-boxes with input difference 0 can only have 0 output difference; from the input difference to the 14th round, increment counters corresponding to each suggested 24 subkey bits by the input difference EEE0E0EE x , and
, we estimate the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), as 2
2 ) = 2 50 , since p = 2 −56 , k = 40, α = 1 (we expect one subkey on average to be suggested in steps (d) and (e)), β = 2
2 , since ∆R 14 = EEE0E0EE x gives a 32-bit condition, every output difference to an S-box whose input difference is 5 x or E x can have only seven possible nonzero output differences, and the S-boxes with input difference 0 can only have 0 output difference. We estimate about m = 128 structures to determine the correct subkey values. This means 2 7+33 = 2 40 CP.
Step (c) imposes a 32-bit condition on the pairs. So, about 2 7+64 /2 32 = 2 39 pairs survive. In step (d), the complexity corresponds to 2 · 2 39 one-round computations. The same holds in step (e). This corresponds to about 2 41 /14 ≈ 2
37.2
14-round computations. The memory complexity corresponds to 2 40 counters. If the user key has 64 bits, the remaining 24 key bits requires 2 24 14-round computations; if the key is 80-bit long, then the remaining 40 key bits requires 2 40 14-round computations.
According to [9] , the success probability p S of this attack, for SNR = 2 50 , a = 8 (i.e. assuming we expect the correct 40-bit subkey to be ranked among the 8 highest counters), N = 2 40 CP, p = 2 −56 , is
Impossible-Differential Cryptanalysis
There is a striking similarity between the round functions of MIBS and Camellia [1] block ciphers. Therefore, inspired by the impossible differential attack on Camellia, proposed by Wu et al. in [11] , we have constructed a similar 8-round impossible differential for MIBS, as the one built for Camellia proposed in [10] . Then, we use this 8-round impossible differential to attack 12-round MIBS.
We have found the following 8-round impossible differential for MIBS:
where u and v are nonzero nibble differences, and the broken arrow indicates that the difference in the left hand side does not cause the difference in the right hand side. We have also found another 8-round impossible differential distinguisher for MIBS: (00000000 x , 00s00000 x ) 8r → (0000000h x , 00000000 x ).
Some Properties of MIBS for 80-bit user key
We have exploited two properties of MIBS to use in the attack:
) denote the i-th round subkey, where K i,1 is the most significant nibble. Then, K 1 and K 2 share 13 bits in common:
where values inside square brackets index bit positions.
Property 2. (similar to [5] ) For any 32-bit strings X, X * , if there exists a nonzero nibble difference s such that P −1 (X ⊕ X * ⊕ 000000s0 x ) is of the form ??0?00?? x , then s is unique (? denotes any nibble value). The same holds for a nonzero nibble difference h.
Proof. Suppose there are two nibble differences s and w that satisfy this property. Then, P is a linear transformation relative to xor,
and has the form ??0?00?? x . But, P −1 (000000s0 x ) ⊕ P −1 (000000w0 x ) = ss0ss0ss x ⊕ ww0ww0ww x . From the fifth nibble position, it follows that s ⊕ w = 0, which is a contradiction.
Construction of 8-round Impossible Differential Distinguisher
This 8-round impossible differential characteristic (4) is constructed by concatenating two 3-round differentials, and putting two connection rounds in between the two differentials. See Fig. 4 . The first 3-round differential, depicted in Table 4 , is built as follows: let the input difference to the first round be (∆L 0 , ∆R 0 ) = (00000000 x , 000000s0 x ) where s is a non-zero nibble difference and after the first round, the input difference to the second round will be (∆L 1 , ∆R 1 ) = (000000s0 x , 00000000 x ). Then in the second round, the input difference 000000s0 x to the S layer leads to the output difference 000000t0 x , where t is a nonzero nibble difference. After applying the P layer, the output difference of the F-function will be tt0t00tt x . The input difference to the third round is (∆L 2 , ∆R 2 ) = (tt0t00tt x , 000000s0 x ). Afterwards, the difference ∆L 2 = tt0t00tt x becomes t 1 t 2 0t 4 00t 7 t 8 after the S layer where t 1 , t 2 , t 4 , t 7 and t 8 are non-zero nibble differences. Then, it evolves to (c 1 c 2 c 3 c 4 c 5 c 6 c 7 c 8 ), c i are nonzero nibble differences, after the application of the P layer, and the output difference of the third round turns out to be (∆L 3
). This completes the first differential. Table 4 . The first 3-round truncated differential for MIBS (in encryption direction).
The second 3-round differential in Table 5 is constructed as follows: let the output difference of round 8 be (∆L 8 , ∆R 8 ) = (0000h000 x , 00000000 x ) and if this difference is rolled back through round 8, then the output difference of round 7 becomes (∆L 7 , ∆R 7 ) = (00000000 x , 0000h000 x ). The difference ∆L 7 = 0000h000 x will be 0000w000 x after the application of the S layer in round 7 and the difference evolves to www0ww00 x after the P layer where w denotes a nonzero nibble. Then, the output difference of round six becomes (∆L 6 , ∆R 6 ) = (www0ww00 x , 0000h000 x ) becomes w 1 w 2 w 3 0w 5 w 6 00, where w i are nonzero nibble differences, after the S layer and we get the input difference of round six as (∆L 5 , ∆R 5 ) = (e 1 e 2 e 3 e 4 e 5 e 6 e 7 e 8 ⊕ 0000h000 x , www0ww00 x ). This completes the second 3-round differential.
Concatenating these two 3-round differentials, we obtain an 8-round impossible differential distinguisher. One can see in Fig. 4 , the input and output differences of the F-function in round 5 are (e 1 e 2 e 3 e 4 e 5 e 6 e 7 e 8 ) ⊕ 0000h000 x and (c 1 c 2 c 3 c 4 c 5 c 6 c 7 c 8 ) ⊕ 000000s0 x ⊕ www0ww00 x = (c 1 ⊕ w, c 2 ⊕ w, c 3 ⊕ w, c 4 , c 5 ⊕ w, c 6 ⊕ w, c 7 ⊕ s, c 8 ), respectively. Since the output difference of the S layer has to be equal to input difference of the P layer, that is, S[(e 1 e 2 e 3 e 4 e 5 e 6 e 7 e 8 ) ⊕ Table 5 . The second 3-round truncated differential for MIBS (in decryption direction).
Round
We can see that the output difference of the third and sixth S-boxes are zero in round five, which implies the input differences of these S-boxes are zero, too since they are bijective. Therefore, e 3 = e 6 = 0 where e 3 = w 1 ⊕ w 2 ⊕ w 3 ⊕ w 5 ⊕ w 6 , e 6 = w 1 ⊕ w 2 ⊕ w 5 ⊕ w 6 . But, if e 3 = w 1 ⊕ w 2 ⊕ w 3 ⊕ w 5 ⊕ w 6 = 0 and e 6 = w 1 ⊕ w 2 ⊕ w 5 ⊕ w 6 = 0, then this leads to w 3 = 0 which contradicts the assumption that w 3 is nonzero. This attack is different from the conventional impossible differential attack in a way that we exploit the equality of some subkey bits to eliminate wrong key guesses by using the impossible differential. Instead of eliminating pairs round by round, we can make a different analysis to reduced the time complexity of the attack: the ciphertext pairs which satisfy the impossible differential should have the output difference of round 10: ∆L 10 = (0000h000 x , 00000000 x ), where h is a nonzero nibble. When the S-box of MIBS is analyzed, one can see that the number of nonzero entries of each row of the DDT is at most 2 3 , that is each nonzero input difference to the S-box causes at most 2 3 nonzero output differences. Therefore, the nonzero nibble h can take 2 4 − 1 = 15 different values and in round 11, the output differences of the S-box, which corresponds to h, has at most 15 · 2 3 possible nonzero output differences. Then in Round 12, five nonzero nibbles at positions (1, 2, 3, 5, 6) have at most (2 3 ) 5 nonzero output differences which result in at most 15 · 2 3 · (2 3 ) 5 ≈ 2 22 possible output differences after the S layer.
The attack procedure is as follows:
Data Collection
Choose 2 m structures of plaintexts of each structure is of the form: 
, R * 12 )), do the following steps:
1. By Property 2, there is only one nibble u which satisfies
, and it has the form ??0?00?? x . Therefore, for each pair of [1] . This equality implies a 4-bit condition on pairs and any pair which satisfies the equality eliminates one wrong 68-bit subkey value: 
Complexity Analysis
Data Complexity: We set m = 0, because it is enough to take just one structure of plaintexts. So, the data complexity the attack is 2 28 chosen plaintexts (CP). Step 3(b), the time complexity is less than 2 13 · 2 12 ≈ 2 10.41 12-round MIBS encryptions. Note that the complexity of checking 4-bit equality in subkeys is negligible.
Memory Complexity: The storage of all chosen plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts is 2 28 · 2 = 2 29 blocks. In step 1, we have to store 2 22 possible output differences which need 2 22 blocks of memory. In the key elimination step, since we have 2 68 bits subkey guess, we need 2 68 · 2 −6 = 2 62 blocks of memory.
To conclude, the time complexity of the attack is dominated by the data filtering step, which is 2 46.42 12-round MIBS encryptions. The memory and the data complexities are 2 62 blocks and 2 28 CP, respectively. The attack recovers 68 bits of the 80-bit secret key; the remaining 12-bit of the secret key can be found by exhaustive search.
Conclusions
This paper described the first independent and systematic linear, differential and impossible-differential analyses of reduced-round versions of the MIBS block cipher [6] . Actually, we presented the best known-plaintext attack so far on up to 18-round MIBS, and the first ciphertext-only attack on 13-round MIBS. These attacks do not threaten the full 32-round MIBS, but reduce by more than 50% its margin of security. Table 6 summarizes the complexities of all attacks on reduced-round MIBS described in this paper. 
